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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY,LOHlcL .:.l1

CHARLES MURRAY, Administrator
of the Estate of Samuel H. Sheppard,
Plaintiff,
V.

ST ATE OF OHIO,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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CASE NO. 3123z°2·; l
JUDGE RO:\ALD SUSTER
MOTION OF DEFENDANT
STATE OF OHIO FOR
LIMITING I"\'STRUCTION

Now comes Defendant State of Ohio who, pursuant to Evid. R. 105, moves this

-

Court to provide a limiting instruction at the commencement of proceeding this day as to
the limited purpose for which the evidence regarding the conviction of Richard Eberling for
the murder of Ethel Durkin has been admitted.
Evid. R. 105 reads as follows:
When evidence which is admissible ... for one purpose but not admissible
... for another purpose, the court, upon request of a party, shall restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.

The language of the rule is mandatory.

Evid. R. 105 serves as a safeguard to

attempt to avoid confusion and undue prejudice to a party when "other acts" evidence is
introduced for a limited purpose under Evid. R. 404(B), despite the prohibition against its
introduction as "propensity" evidence.
The operation of the Evid R. 105 was explained in State v. Valentine (Ohio App.2
Dist. 1992), Case No. 13192, unreported (attached). There, the Court explained:

A part is entitled under the Rule to a limiting instruction directed to the
jury whenever evidence might be misapplied by the jury in reaching its
verdict. Professor Weissenberger has commented that, "the Rule imposes
mandatory duty upon the court to issue the instruction upon such a
request." Weissenberger, Ohio Evidence, Vol. 1, Section 105 .2.
The unfair prejudice inherent in evidence of other wrongdoing,
particularly evidence of a prior criminal conviction, is that a jury will infer
from it a propensity of the accused to commit the crime charged. That,
clear'ly, is an improper inference ....

On February 12, 2000, this Court entered an order regarding "other acts" of Richard
Eberling. This Court ordered, " ... no mention shall be made of these 'other acts' without
the prior approval of the court."
The State of Ohio has been prejudiced by the introduction of the fact that Eberling
has been convicted of another murder. The jury should be instructed that the re is no

-

connection to be made between the murder of Marilyn Sheppard and the murder of Ethel
Durkin and that Eberling's conviction is not evidence that he killed Marilyn Sheppard.
The State of Ohio's proposed limited instruction is attached.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting Attorney
Of Cuyahoga County, Ohio

KATHLEEN A:-'MARTIN (0040017)
Litigation Manager, Civil Division
The Justice Center, Courts Tower
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443- 7785
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing Motion of Defendant, State of Ohio, for Limiting
Instruction was sent by ordinary United States Mail, postage prepaid, to Terry H. Gilbert,
1370 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113, and also via facsimile transmission to Terry
H. Gilbert at (216) 621-0427, this 24th day of February, 2000.

~~#~
KATHLEEN A. MARTIN (0040017)
Litigation Manager, Civil Division

-

-

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED LI.MITING INSTURCTION

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, yesterday I allowed testimony that Richard Eberling was
convicted in 1989 of the murder of Ethel Durkin. That crime occurred in 1984, nearly 30
years after the murder of Marilyn Sheppard.
I

I permitted that testimony for the limited purpose of allowing Kathie Dyal to explain why,
according to her, she waited so long to come forward to report the conversation she says
she had with Richard Eberling regarding Marilyn Sheppard.

I instruct you that the fact that Eberling was convicted of that other crime is not evidence

-

that Richard Eberling killed Marilyn Sheppard. I advise you that you may not make any
conclusion or draw any inference that the murder of Ethel Durkin is in any way related to
murder of Marilyn Sheppard 30 years earlier.

1992 WL 137101, State v. Valentine, (Ohio App. 2 Dist. 1992)
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NOTICE: RULE 2 OF THE OHIO
SUPREME
COURT
RULES
FOR
THE
,..._ REPORTING
OF
OPINIONS
IMPOSES
RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE
USE OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.
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including Valentine, over the wire. On his first pass
by Valentine the two men made eye contact. On the
second pass Mauch stopped his car.
Valentine
approached Mauch and asked what he was "looking
for". Mauch replied that he wanted a "twenty dollar
rock" of crack cocaine.

ST ATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee,

....

Patrick VALENTINE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 13192.
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District,
Montgomery County.
June 19, 1992.
Lorine M. Reid, Asst. Pros.
plaimiff-appellee.

Atty., Dayton, for

David L. Hall, Dayton, for defendant-appellant.
OPINION
GRADY, Judge.

-

**l On November 4, 1991, Patrick Valentine was
convicted of Aggravated Trafficking in Cocaine, in
violation of R.C. 2925.03(C)(l). Previously, on May
16, 1990, Valentine had been convicted of Aggravated
Drug Trafficking, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(l).
Pursuant to 2925.03(C)(l), the prior conviction
elevated the subsequent offense from a third degree
felony to a second degree felony.
Valentine argues that the trial court erred in
permitting evidence of his prior conviction to be
presented to the jury, or, in the alternative, in failing
to give a cautionary instruction to the jury regarding
the prior conviction. Valentine also argues that he
was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel.
We find that the trial court erred in failing to give
the jury a cautionary instruction requested by
Valentine, which was pertinent to the issues and a
correct statement of the law. The conviction will be
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

-

On August 28, 1991 the Dayton Police Department
conducted a "sting" operation along a portion of
Highview Avenue. Detective Mauch, dressed in
street clothes, drove through the area several times in
an unmarked car. Mauch was wired so that any
transactions could be recorded and monitored by other
detectives.
Mauch described several individuals,

Valentine got into Mauch's car and the two rode
about for several minutes.
Valentine eventually
handed Mauch a rock of crack cocaine and Mauch
offered Valentine a twenty dollar bill. Valentine told
Mauch to lay the money on the ground and drive
av,·ay. Mauch did so, and through his rear view
mirror saw Valentine pick up the money. As Mauch
drove away he made a radio report of the events to the
other detectives on the team.
About five minutes later other police officers entered
the area and, based on the information from Mauch,
approached Valentine and several other men and
asked them for identification.
They detained
Valentine and patted him down. The pat down
produced a crack pipe.
Valentine was arrested,
searched more thoroughly, and taken to jail.
Valentine was charged with Aggravated Trafficking,
in violation of R.C. 2925.03(C)(l). He was found
guilty and sentenced to four to fifteen years
incarceration.
Valentine has filed a timely notice of appeal.
presents three assignments of error.

He

II

Appellant's first assignment of error, presented in
the form of a question, states:
IS THE PRIOR CONVICTION FOR (sic)
LANGUAGE OF O.R.C. 2925.03(C)(l) AN
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
UNDER 2925.03(A)(l)?
R.C. 2925.03 provides:
(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the
following:
(1) Sell or offer to sell a controlled substance in an
amount less than the minimum bulk amount;
***

***
**2

(C) If the drug involved is any compound,
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mixture, preparation, or substance included in
schedule I, with the exception of marihuana, or in
schedule II, whoever violates this section is guilty of
aggravated trafficking.

mandated that the prior conviction be pied and
proven by the State as an element of the subsequent
offense().

(1) Where the offender has violated division (A)(l)
of this section, aggravated trafficking is a felony of
the third degree, except that, if the offender ... has

In accordance with the language of R.C.
2925.03(C)(l) and the rule of Harowski, we find that
the trial court did not err in determining that
Valentine's prior drug conviction was an element of
the charge he faced at trial.

previously been convicted of a felony drug abuse
offense, aggravated trafficking is a felony of the
second degree. (Emphasis supplied).

The first assignment of error is overruled.

I

Valentine argues that his prior conviction for
aggravated trafficking is not an element of the offense
with which he was charged but is, rather, a penalty
enhancement.
For this reason, Valentine argues,
evidence of the prior conviction should not have been
presented to the jury, but should have been considered
only by the judge for sentencing purposes.
As this court stated recently in State v. Harowski
(September 20, 1991), Mont.App. No. 12232,
unreported:

-

-

The issue of when a prior offense is a necessary
element of a subsequent offense was clearly resolved
by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Allen (1987),
29 Ohio St.3d 53. In Allen, the court examined the
precedent cases of State v. Gordon (1971), 28 Ohio
St.2d 45 and State v. Henderson (1979), 58 Ohio
St. 2d 171 and reaffirmed their holdings that where a
prior conviction transforms the offense to be tried by
increasing its degree, the prior conviction is an
essential element which must be pied and proved by
the State.
The court further held that this
requirement is limited to those cases in which the
prior conviction elevates the degree of the
subsequent offense, and does not apply in cases in
which the prior conviction merely enhances the
penalty for the subsequent offense.
In order to determine whether (Appellant's) prior
drug conviction elevated the degree of the drug
trafficking offense( ) in question, we need only turn
to the statute under which (Appellant) was charged.
Revised Code 2925.03(C)(l) states:
'Where the
offender has violated division (A)(!) of this section,
aggravated trafficking is a felony of the third degree,
and if the offender has previously been convicted of
a felony drug abuse offense, aggravated trafficking is
a felony of the second degree.' Thus, (Appellant's)
prior drug conviction would, under this statute,
elevate his subsequent offense( ) from (a) felon(y) of
the third degree to (a) felon(y) of the second degree.
This resulting transformation, according to Allen,

III
Appellant's second assignment of error states:
**3 WHETHER THE COURT BELOW ERRED
IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO RECEIVE
EVIDENCE
OF
DEFENDANT'S
PRIOR
CONVICTION?
Valentine makes several distinct arguments under
this assignment of error. He first argues that, even
assuming the prior conviction is an element of the
offense charged, the trial court erred by submitting
evidence of the prior conviction to the jury. We do
not agree. The jury was required to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Valentine had previously been
convicted of Aggravated Trafficking. Evidence must
be presented to the jury for that purpose and the trial
court did not err in admitting such evidence.
Valentine also argues that a Termination Entry was
not competent to prove the prior conviction and that it
should not have been admitted in evidence.
He
contends that a "certified judgment entry" is required
to prove a prior conviction, pursuant to R.C.
2941.142. However, that statute concerns proof of
prior
conv1ct1ons
for
purposes
of
penalty
enhancement. Its requirements are not applicable to
proof of an element of the offense. Furthermore, the
use of a certified judgment entry to show a prior
conviction is permissive, not mandatory, under R.C.
2941.142. Its use was proper here.
Valentine's last argument under this assignment is
that the trial court erred in declining to give a
cautionary or limiting instruction to the jury
concerning evidence of his prior offense. Valentine
had requested the following instruction:
Evidence has been presented that Patrick Valentine
was previously convicted of a felony drug abuse
offense. That evidence is not proof that Patrick
Valentine sold "crack" cocaine on August 28, 1911.

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
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You must make no inference that Patrick Valentine
committed the offense with which he is presently
charged based upon his prior conviction.
Every criminal defendant is "entitled to a fair trial,
and a requisite part of that fair trial is to have a fairly
instructed jury." State v. Nelson (1973), 36 Ohio
St.2d 79, 85. Crim.R. 30(B) sets forth the procedure
for delivering cautionary instructions to the jury:
At the commencement and during the course of the
trial, the court may give the jury cautionary and
other instructions of law relating to trial procedure,
credibility and weight of the evidence, and the duty
and function of the jury and may acquaint the jury
generally with the nature of the case.
Action by the trial court pursuant to Crim.R. 30(B)
is discretionary and should not be disturbed on review
unless the court abuses its discretion. Stare v. Frost
(1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 320. In a criminal context,
an abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of
law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful. Stare v. Adams
(1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151.

-

The scope of the trial court's discretion under
Crim. R. 30(B) is substantially curtailed when the
requested cautionary instruction concerns not
procedure, the regularity and validity of which is
supported by a rebuttable presumption, but, instead,
concerns an issue of evidence. Evid.R. 105 provides:
**4 When evidence which is admissible as to one
party or for one purpose but not admissible as to
another party or for another purpose is admitted, the
court, upon request of a party, shall restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly.
The Staff Note to Rule 105 observes that it has a
close relationship to Evid.R. 403, which permits
exclusion of otherwise competent evidence "if to
admit the evidence would cause the 'dangers of unfair
prejudice.' " Evid.R. 105 does not contemplate
exclusion of evidence.
Here, evidence of the
Appellant's prior conviction could not excluded as it
was required to prove an element of the offense
alleged. However, a proper cautionary instruction
could be given limiting the jury's consideration of the
prior conviction.

-

A party is entitled under the Rule to a limiting
instruction directed to the jury whenever evidence
might be misapplied by the jury in reaching its
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verdict. Professor Weissenberger has commented
that, "the Rule imposes mandatory duty upon the court
to issue the instruction upon such a request."
Weissenberger, Ohio Evidence, Vol. 1, Section
105.2.
The unfair prejudice inherent in evidence of other
wrongdoing, particularly evidence of a prior criminal
conviction, is that a jury will infer from it a
propensity of the accused to commit the crime
charged. That, clearly, is an improper inference as it
is inconsistent with the right of the accused to a fair
trial on those charges. An accused who requests an
instruction against such an inference is entitled to have
it. If "the requested instructions contain a correct,
pertinent statement of the law and are appropriate to
the facts they must be included, at least in substance,
in the court's charge to the jury." State v. t•:etson,
supra. Cincinnati v. Epperson (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d
59.
The instruction requested by Defendant-Appellant
Valentine is appropriate to the facts of the case and is
a correct and pertinent statement of the law. Each
element of the offense charged must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. The jury may make reasonable
inferences from the evidence before it. However, the
functional elements of the alleged crime, a sale of
crack cocaine on August 28, 1991, are not directly
proved by the fact of a prior conviction, and no
reasonable inference can be drawn from the prior
conviction to prove the functional elements
circumstantially. Any inference that the accused
committed those functional elements or acts out of a
propensity to commit crime is an unreasonable
inference that denies the accused his right to a fair
trial on the discrete offense charged. Therefore, a
cautionary instruction to the jury that they may not
make such an inference is warranted, and is mandated
by Evid.R. 105 if requested.
The particular instruction requested is, perhaps,
overly broad in cautioning that the jury may not
"infer" commission of the charged crime from the
prior conviction. The prior conviction is an element
of the crime charged, so that inference is proper.
However, the purpose of the cautionary instruction
may be met by revising the third sentence to state:
"You must make no inference that Patrick Valentine
sold crack cocaine on August 28, 1991, based upon
his prior conviction."
Alternatively, the third
sentence may be omitted to preserve the meaning and
value of the instruction. On these facts, and in view
of the extreme prejudice resulting from evidence of
the prior conviction, we find that the trial coun erred

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt. works
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when it refused to give the requested instruction, at
least in substance.
**5 An error may be harmless if other evidence of
guilt is so overwhelming that guilt may yet be found
beyond a reasonable doubt. We cannot find the other
evidence of guilt overwhelming in this case. The
alleged sale was a one-on-one transaction. Other
officers heard parts by radio, but the transmission was
interrupted and incomplete. The Defendant was found
after arrest to have a "crack pipe", which Officer
Mauch testified he saw during the sale transaction.
While that evidence supports Mauch's credibility, it
does not prove the alleged sale of cocaine. The
evidence, while compelling, is not such that we can
find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

To the extent it argues that the requested jury
instruction regarding Valentine's prior conviction was
required, Appellant's second assignment of error is
sustained.
IV
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trafficking offense without alerting other subjects of
the existence of the "sting" operation. Apparently,
such encounters are not out of the ordinary events in
this high crime area.
Valentine's reliance on Terry v. Ohio. supra, is
misplaced. The search of Valentine was not a "pat
down" pursuant to a Terry stop. It was a search
incident to his arrest. Valentine was stopped and
searched based on evidence that he was the person
who had a few minutes earlier sold crack cocaine to
Detective Mauch. Valentine had been identified by
Detective Mauch over his wire and by radio; other
officers then stopped and arrested him. Information
obtained by officers engaged in a common
investigation may be used by one of them as probable
cause for an arrest. State v. Henderson (1990), 51
Ohio St.3d 54. A search incident to a lawful arrest
is, of course. proper. Stare v. Kuns (October 2,
1990), Mont.App. No. 11823, unreported; Chime! v.
California (1969), 395 U.S. 752. on the argument
presented, we conclude that trial counsel was not
deficient in his representation because he did not file a
motion to suppress.

Appellant's third assignment of error states:

-

WHETHER DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS WERE
PREJUDICED DUE TO THE INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL?
Valentine argues that three specific actions of trial
counsel amounted to ineffective assistance.
To
establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment on the
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
criminal defendant must show (1) that counsel's
performance was deficient and (2) that counsel's
deficient performance resulted in prejudice. State v.
Lytle (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 391; Strickland v.
Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668.

-

Valentine first argues that his trial counsel should
have filed a motion to suppress evidence of the crack
pipe found on him when he was "patted down" by
officers. He relies on Terry v. Ohio ( 1968), 392 U.S.
l, which requires a reasonable and articulable
suspicion of criminal activity and a belief that the
suspect may be armed and a danger to the officer as a
prerequisite to the "pat down". Valentine argues that
the officers who searched him had no knowledge or
basis to suspect him of criminal activity or that he was
dangerous. The State argues that the officers relied
on information from Officer Mauch concerning the
sale transaction, and that the "investigative stop" of
Valentine and several other men was simply a
pretextual means to take Valentine into custody for the

**6. Second, Valentine argues that trial counsel was
ineffective because he was unprepared for crossexamination of Detective Mauch. He first claims that
trial counsel failed to move to strike after a question
calling for hearsay was objected to but the answer \vas
given. Valentine cites to page 18 of the Transcript,
wherein Officer Mauch was asked whether in his
experience marked money given to a subject is
sometimes not found on him after arrest.
An
objection was made and sustained, but Mauch
answered, "Yes". It was not hearsay, however, and
Valentine has not demonstrated how the ansv.;er could
have prejudiced his case.

Valentine also cites pages 34 and 38 of the
transcript. He makes no attempt to elucidate for this
court, however, any failures trial counsel's
performance at these points, other than to state
generally that failure to prepa:e for cross examination
and failure to object to hearsay testimony amounts to
ineffective assistance of counsel.
No hearsay
evidence was given at either of these passages of the
transcript. Again, the record does not demonstrate
that trial counsel was unprepared for cross
examination.
Valentine also asserts that trial counsel failed to
move for acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29 at the close
of the State's evidence. A motion for acquittal is not
required. There is no basis in the record from which
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to conclude that a motion would have resulted in an
acquittal.
The third assignment of error is overruled.

v
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Having sustained Appellant's second assignment of
error upon a finding that the trial court erred in failing
to give a requested jury instruction, and because we
cannot find that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, the judgment of conviction will be
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

CONCLUSIONS
FAIN, P.J., and WOLFF, J., concur.

-
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